传感器网络在网络中心战中的应用

介绍了传感器网络对比于分立式传感器的优势所在,指出传感器网络通过多点数据融合及任务指派的方法加强传感器网络在监视和跟踪空中目标、地面活动目标、以及特殊目标(如联合战区防空反导、目标战损估计)中的应用。提出了传感器网络应该解决的几个具体问题;包括节点选择与优化部署方面的组建原则、任务指派方面的注意事项、资源管理的目标要求、异构资源信息共享的四种解决方法、以及网络安全(关于网络本身的健壮性以及数据的安全性)等方面的问题和解决方法。     

半径突变多模圆锥馈源的分析和设计

报道了一种８毫米波段半径突变的高效率多模圆锥馈源,计算出其模比并推导出其辐射方向图公式,给出了它在两个主平面－Ｅ面和Ｈ面上的辐射方向图的理论计算结果和测试结果,以及频带和旁瓣特性。分析和测试结果表明,在３４．１～３５．５ＧＨｚ频带内该多模馈源的辐射方向图在大于－２３ｄＢ范围内不出现旁瓣,在大于－１３ｄＢ范围内幅度等化良好。     

基于均分簇算法的战争Ad Hoc网络广播风暴抑制

网络广播是维持网络正常运作的基本手段,但Ad Hoc网络拓朴的频繁变化,将使网络广播无法进行收敛,形成广播最终会使本来就受限的资源趋于濒绝,网络无法通信而瘫痪.为此,提出了一种自适应均分簇理论SACA,通过分层虚拟子网的过滤与阻隔算法,有效地抑制网络广播风暴.     

The value of information sharing in a two‐stage supply chain with production capacity constraints

We consider a simple two‐stage supply chain with a single retailer facing i.i.d. demand and a single manufacturer with finite production capacity. We analyze the value of information sharing between the retailer and the manufacturer over a finite time horizon. In our model, the manufacturer receives demand information from the retailer even during time periods in which the retailer does not order. To analyze the impact of information sharing, we consider the following three strategies: (1) the retailer does not share demand information with the manufacturer; (2) the retailer does share demand information with the manufacturer and the manufacturer uses the optimal policy to schedule production; (3) the retailer shares demand information with the manufacturer and the manufacturer uses a greedy policy to schedule production. These strategies allow us to study the impact of information sharing on the manufacturer as a function of the production capacity, and the frequency and timing in which demand information is shared. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2003     

The incentive effect of acceptance sampling plans in a supply chain with endogenous product quality

This article studies a firm that procures a product from a supplier. The quality of each product unit is measured by a continuous variable that follows a normal distribution and is correlated within a batch. The firm conducts an inspection and pays the supplier only if the product batch passes the inspection. The inspection not only serves the purpose of preventing a bad batch from reaching customers but also offers the supplier an incentive to improve product quality. The firm determines the acceptance sampling plan, and the supplier determines the quality effort level in either a simultaneous game or a Stackelberg leadership game, in which both parties share inspection cost and recall loss caused by low product quality. In the simultaneous game, we identify the Nash equilibrium form, provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and find parameter settings under which the decentralized and centralized supply chains achieve the same outcome. By numerical experiments, we show that the firm's acceptance sampling plan and the supplier's quality effort level are sensitive to both the recall loss sharing ratio and the game format (i.e., the precommitment assumption of the inspection policy). © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Pool it,share it,or lose it: an economical view on pooling and sharing of European military capabilities

In a general and economical view, this article analyzes methods and mechanisms for the pooling and sharing of military forces and weapons inside the European Union (EU) in times of scarcity. Pooling and sharing could improve the EU military capabilities significantly if differences in location factors were taken into account and all states would focus on their respective strengths. More competition and less concentration are the keys to ensuring guaranteed access to military assets. Pooling and sharing are likely to be successful only if large states enhance their emphasis on collective defense by mutual aid and self-help, and reduce particularistic and parochial interests of local gain. The realm of personnel has the most potential for improvement but any change is likely to generate policy implications.     

UK firms’ experience and perceptions of defence offsets: Survey results 1

Offsets are a growing feature of international trade in defence equipment. This article assesses the economics of offsets and outlines UK offsets policy. There is a lack of empirical work in the field and the article presents the results of a survey of UK firms’ experience of their involvement in offsets against UK imports of defence equipment. There is also a case study of the AWACS offset programme and an evaluation of policy implications.     

基于秘密共享的卫星网络组密钥管理方案

针对卫星网络组密钥管理的重要性,提出了一个可认证的基于门限秘密共享的组密钥管理方案．结合卫星网络的动态拓扑结构特点,将地面站作为组成员的身份注册中心,以实现对组成员的身份认证,确保节点的合法性．为了提高组密钥的生成效率,选取≠一1颗可见时间长的卫星构建组密钥份额分发中心,降低了组密钥联合生成过程中的通信量．组密钥协商无需安全信道,节省了系统资源．安全性及性能分析表明,该方案不仅具有较强的安全性,而且还具有计算和通信量小的优点．参数分析表明,门限值k与组密钥更新周期T是影响方案安全性的2个重要因子．     

Should firms conceal information when dealing with common suppliers?

A firm making quantity decision under uncertainty loses profit if its private information is leaked to competitors. Outsourcing increases this risk as a third party supplier may leak information for its own benefit. The firm may choose to conceal information from the competitors by entering in a confidentiality agreement with the supplier. This, however, diminishes the firm's ability to dampen competition by signaling a higher quantity commitment. We examine this trade‐off in a stylized supply chain in which two firms, endowed with private demand information, order sequentially from a common supplier, and engage in differentiated quantity competition. In our model, the supplier can set different wholesale prices for firms, and the second‐mover firm could be better informed. Contrary to what is expected, information concealment is not always beneficial to the first mover. We characterize conditions under which the first mover firm will not prefer concealing information. We show that this depends on the relative informativeness of the second mover and is moderated by competition intensity. We examine the supplier's incentive in participating in information concealment, and develop a contract that enables it for wider set of parameter values. We extend our analysis to examine firms' incentive to improve information. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 62:1–15, 2015     

应急器材柔性采购定价建模与求解

由于当前应急器材储备依然存在“多储”或“少储”风险,为提高储备效益,以企业经济效益与军队采购成本为优化目标,提出了应急器材柔性采购策略。通过建立企业储备策略与军队采购定价最优化模型,求解得到了在不同战争爆发概率及器材现货市场价格区间等外部环境因素下的军队最佳柔性定价及对应的企业最优储备策略,并通过实例分析验证了得出的决策结论。结果表明,最优策略的实施将有利于军队与企业共担应急器材数量储备风险。